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Coevolution of game and network structure: The temptation increases the cooperator
density
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(Dated: October 25, 2018)
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. How-
ever, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure
will affect the people’s strategy too. We build a coevolutionary model of prisoner’s dilemma game
and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Based on the asynchronous
update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to
the richer, the cooperation density will increase. The reason of it has been analyzed.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.50.+q, 64.60.Ht, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is a key aspect in the real world, rang-
ing from biological systems to human behavior [1, 2].
Therefore, people restore to the game theory to study the
emergency and maintenance of cooperation in biology,
psychology, computer science, and economics [3, 4, 5, 6].
Especially, the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), has be-
come a metaphor to approach the emergency of cooper-
ation and altruism behavior. In the tradition PDG, each
of two players chooses a strategy from cooperation (C)
or defection (D) simultaneously and gets payoff. They
both receive R upon mutual C and P upon mutual D.
A defector gets T when it plays game with cooperator
who gets S. In PDG, we have T > R > P > S and
2R > S+T . Because the mutual C get the highest total
income, D is the better choice than C no mater what the
other player’s strategy. Without any mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation, natural selection favors defec-
tion. The other widely studied games include snowdrift
game [7, 8], public good game [9], rock-paper-scissors
game [10], and so on.
The complex network has also attracted lots of atten-
tions in the past few years. The complex network is
ubiquitous in nature. The human society can also be
described as the systems composed of interacting agents.
The classical social network maps the individual into the
node, and the connection between individuals into the
link. The evolutionary game theory in spatial structure
has became a unifying paradigm to study how coopera-
tion may be sustained in a structured population [11]. It
was found that the spatial extension is one of several nat-
ural mechanisms to enforce cooperation. Network struc-
ture will affect the behavior of strategy density [12]. In
lattice network, the cooperation is usually get together to
support each other to resist the defection [8, 13, 14]. San-
tos and Pacheco found in Scale-Free networks the strong
correlation leads to the dominating trait throughout the
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entire range of parameters of both games in scale-free
networks [15]. And also, there are anmount of researches
on other networks, like small-world [16] and random net-
work [17].
When the player on the structure network chose the
better strategy to play game, in fact, not that the play-
ers select the proper strategy, but player’s strategy is
determined by the network structure. For example, in
scale-free networks, the large degree nodes (hubs) and
the nodes which connect to hubs tend to be occupied by
C [15].
The networks used in the most papers of this field
are statistic. The connection will never change once it
is build. It is not realistic enough, as the interactions
themselves help shape the network [16]. What is more,
in the real world, the relationship between the people is
not constant. Sometimes people cannot cut some rela-
tionship with their relatives, neighbors or colleagues but
they can end their old relationship and build a new one.
Sometimes this changing is caused by the results of the
game, because people would like to make friends in a re-
ciprocal respect. For example, people always like to make
friends with rich one for a sake of pursuing fortune. So,
when we study the social model in network like PDG,
the network structure should be dynamical entities [18].
The nodes can remove or sustain their link in network
according to the game results.
Till now, there are few models studied the cooperative
behaviors in a groups with adaptive connections. Besides
some early work [19, 20], Arne build a coevolution model
of strategy and structure [18]. In this model, the proba-
bility of forming or cutting link between node A and B is
based on their strategies. The changing of network struc-
ture is result from the strategy changing in the network.
Then it also affect the strategy density back. However,
the link could change even if the nodes’ strategy do not
change in their model. The rewire of link in this model
is not the player’s own decision. Li et al. also build
a coevolution model that the node rewire its link only
for changing its strategy [21]. Moreover, in this model,
the node rewire its long range link based on the existed
network structure, not the playing game results.
In our opinion, a rational model for coevolution of
2game and network structure should contain two features:
(1) The nodes rewire their links only when agents change
their status; (2) The rewiring should be based on the
playing results of game. In this paper, we will present
a coevolution model of the PDG and network. We use
PDG as a metaphor to studying cooperation between un-
related individuals and consider a social networks with
four fixed local links and one adjustable long-range link
(LRL). The agents in the network play game with their
network neighbors. They will change their strategies and
adjust LRLs according to the results of game. Then the
network structure changing also affect the cooperation
density.
II. MODEL
We set up a system of N players arranged at the nodes
of a ring lattice network. Each node is connected with
four local nodes. These local interactions will not change
during the whole process of the evolution. Besides four
fixed links, every node in this lattice has an adjustable
LRL which connects to another node and self-connections
and the duplicate links are excluded. We call the LRL
out-link for the node to whom it belong or in-link for the
node to whom it connect. The node can select another
node to which the out-link wires, but it cannot give up
the LRL. Therefore, each node has at least one out-link
and many possible in-links. When node changes its strat-
egy, it will also rewire its LRL. We will discuss when and
how LRLs rewire later.
As suggested by Nowak and May [11], we adopt R = 1,
T = b (1 < b < 2), and S = P = 0. Then b can
be considered as the temptation to D against C. Every
player plays the PDGs with its neighbors on network and
itself and get the total payoffW . After each round of the
game, players are allowed to inspect their neighbors’ total
payoffs and change their strategies in the next round.
The player i updates its strategy by selecting one of its
neighbors j with a probability γij ,
γij =
∑
m∈Ωi
kj(t)
km(t)
, (1)
where Ωi is the community composed of the nearest
neighbors of the player i, and km(t) is the degree of
node m at time t. In the spirit of preferential attach-
ment proposed by A.-L. Bara´basi and R. Albert [22], we
incorporate the preferential selection rule to model social
behaviors. In Eq. 1, player with large degree has more
probability to impact his neighbors. That is true in the
society that people who have great impact often have
lots of social relations and they are also focused by their
friends. Node i will follow the node j’s strategy by the
probability,
W =
1
1 + exp [(Wi −Wj)/κ]
, (2)
where Wi and Wj are the total payoffs of node i and j,
and κ indicates the noise generated by the players allow-
ing irrational choices [13, 23, 24].
If node j has the same strategy with i or i do not mimic
j’s strategy, node i will do nothing. Otherwise, it will
rewire its LRL to a new one. There are two rewiring rules
in our model: random rewiring and preferential rewiring.
With probability pc, the density of cooperation in the
network, node i will chose a new node randomly. For the
rest probability 1− pc, node i will chose a new node ac-
cording to the node’s payoff. In the preferential rewiring
rule, the node rewires its link according to the payoff of
all nodes in network,
λij =
∑
m∈G
Wαj
Wαm
, (3)
where λij is the probability of node i rewiring its link
to j and G presents all nodes in the graph. α is used
to change the effect of payoff. α = 0 indicates that the
payoff has no effect here and the nodes rewire their links
randomly. For α > 0, the node will prefer to connect the
node with larger payoffs. So it also looks like a kind of
preferential selection rule.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We run our simulations with varying b and α for fixed
κ = 0.1 and the system size N = 1000. All the results in
this paper are obtained from the average results with 100
different Monte Carlo (MC) simulation trails. We start
with node linking its LRLs to other nodes randomly with
equal probability and random initial state with pc = 0.5
as the initial state. The players update their strategies in
random sequence. In every MC step, all nodes have one
chance to change their strategies and rewire their links.
A. Strategy evolution
Figure 1 shows the frequency of cooperators pc in our
model as the functions of b for different α. Similar to evo-
lutionary game in regular network [13, 14], we also find
two thresholds in our model. Full cooperation is achieved
if b does not exceed the threshold bc1. For b > bc2, C can-
not resist the temptation of b and cannot survive in the
network. In the region of bc1 < b < bc2, C and D can
coexist in the network. Compared with the case of α = 0,
the position of bc1 does not change with α. However, α
affect the bc2 conspicuously.
The probability of node using preferential selection to
rewire its LRL is 1−pc. Therefore α does not work at pc
close to 1 or b close to bc1. When α < 1.6, the qualita-
tive results pc remain unaffected by α that pc decreases
monotonous with b. When α > 1.6, there exists a region
of b promoting cooperation obviously. This promotion
starts at b = 1.64 (α = 1.6) and this region enlarge with
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Frequency of cooperators pc for differ-
ent α as functions of the advantage of defectors b.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Frequency of cooperators pc evolve
with t for systems at different parameters on PDGs.
increasing α. But the effect of promotion does not in-
crease with α. We observe that pc does not change at
1.55 < b < 1.65 for α = 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9. Actually, the
transition is caused by the changing of network structure.
We will discuss it in the next subsection.
In order to discuss how the α promotes pc in the pro-
motion region, we present the time evolutions of pc in
Fig. 2 for fixed b = 1.5 with different α values. The red,
blue, and black lines are the averages of 100 trials for
α = 0, 1.5, and 1.9 respectively. The green one is the pc
time series of one trail in the black line. For α = 0 and
1.5, pc decreases with time to its station state quickly.
As shown in Fig. 1, pc for α = 1.5 is a little higher than
that of α = 0. However, for α = 1.9, pc decreases like
α = 0 firstly, and then the evolution of network drives pc
increasing with time to 0.76. Considering that the black
line is the average of 100 trails, we believe the green line
in Fig. 2 contains more details of the evolution. In the
early stage of the green line, pc decreases to a temporary
stable state in a manner similar to but a little larger than
α = 1.5. However, at t = 2000, there is a sharp increas-
ing in the green line from about 0.4 to 0.76 which is also
the final level of the average result (the black line). It
means that the gradually increasing of the black line is
caused by the average effect of 100 same sharply increase
at different times.
B. Network structure
In this model the behavior of pc and the evolution of
network structure are equal important. The evolution of
network structure results in the transition of pc.
In order to describe the network structure, we first
present the degree distribution P (k) in Fig. 3. Panel
(a) is P (k) in the case of the stable state of red line in
Fig. 2. Here the preferential rewiring does not work and
all LRLs select the target nodes randomly. Considering
the self-connection is forbidden, we know
P (k) = Ck−5N−5
(
1
N − 4
)k−5 (
1−
1
N − 4
)N−k+5
.
Here N usually is large enough, so one can get
P (k) = Ck−5N
(
1
N
)k−5(
1−
1
N
)N−k+5
.
Figure 3(b) is P (k) for the stable state of blue line in
Fig. 2. P (k) in (b) is similar to that of (a) but the largest
degree is 19. Fig. 3(c) is P (k) for the stable state of gree
line in Fig. 2 and (d) is for the green line after the sharp
increasing.
Both (c) and (d) in Fig. 3 are the degree distributions
of one trial, but not the cumulative stationary degree dis-
tribution of 100 different trials. By comparing (c) with
(d), it is helpful to uncover the reason of the sharp in-
creasing in Fig. 2. In Fig. 3 (d), there is only one node
that its degree is larger than half of the other nodes con-
nected to it. We name this node which has the largest
degree in the network as hub node (HN). As presented
in Fig. 4, the other nodes can be divided into two types:
the nodes connect their LRLs to HN and the nodes do
not. We name the first node as AN and the second one as
BN. The number of them are NA and NB, respectively.
Now, we exam the detail of the network after the sharp
increasing in the green line (α = 1.9, b = 1.5) of Fig. 2.
Note that the strategy of HN is always C and the strat-
egy of most ANs is also C. Before the sharp increasing or
in the case of other parameters without sharp increasing,
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The cumulative stationary degree dis-
tributions P (k) in PDGs.
FIG. 4: (Color online) Illustration of HN, AN, and BN. Each
node in the network has four fixed links and there are five red
nodes wire their LRLs to the blue one. In order to make AN
and HN prominent, we do not draw the LRLs of other nodes.
The blue node has the largest degree in this net, so blue node
is HN, and the red one is AN and the others are BN. We draw
the arrows in the figure to present these LRLs are out-links
for AN and in-links for HN.
the HNs are also prefer to C. This phenomenon is also
observed in some other networks with hub nodes [15, 21].
More detailed information of our model are listed in Ta-
ble I.
In Table I, pAc is the cooperation density of AN and
pBc is for BN. Almost all nodes of ANs chose the strat-
egy C, so we do not need to present the mean payoff of
AN with D. What is more, it is found that pBc = 0.308
is close to the case of α = 0 (pc = 0.314 for b = 1.5,
pc = 0.235 for b = 1.55, and pc = 0.179 for b = 1.6).
TABLE I: The detailed information of prisoner’s dilemma
games (α = 1.9).
b = 1.5 b = 1.55 b = 1.6
NA 669 621 605
NB 330 378 394
pc 0.766 0.686 0.663
pAc 0.992 0.988 0.987
pBc 0.308 0.191 0.164
payoff of AN 5.213 4.806 4.682
payoff of BN with C 5.222 4.987 5.025
payoff of BN with D 5.713 5.541 5.561
It means that the existence of AN does not affect the
strategy density of BN. As discussed in Ref. [21], AN can
resist the temptation of b by mimicking the strategy of
HN. After the sharp increasing, the probability that AN
mimics the strategy of HN is much larger than that of
other neighbors. The HN’s payoff is also larger because
it has a lots of in-link LRLs. We will discuss the de-
tails of these probabilities in the next subsection. On the
other hand, only the node with strategy C can grow into
HN. If HN is occupied by D, HN will get higher payoff
temporarily. However, as we discussed above, AN will
follow HN’s strategy and the strategy of AN will be D.
Then the HN cannot earn payoff from its in-link LRLs.
Once HN cannot earn enough payoff, both preferential
and random rewiring will drive ANs to rewire its LRL to
other nodes. Then a new HN with strategy C will appear
in the network. So it seems that strategy C is a better
choice for HN because it can earn a stable higher payoff.
From Table I, we also find that the BNs with D earn
the most payoff and the payoff of BN with C is close
to the payoff of AN. However, although the mean payoff
of BN with D is the highest, in fact, the density of co-
operator doesn’t decrease with time. It shows that the
probability of C mimicking D strategy and D mimicking
C strategy are the same.
Each horizontal line in Fig. 5 presents a snapshot of
the network. We arrange these snapshots with time from
top to the botton to show how the AN evolves with time.
So we can depict every players strategies in network and
observe the evolution of these strategies. The riht panel
is NA at the same time with the left. There is also a
sharp increasing of NA at the same time like the green
line in Fig. 2 in looks. At t = 1750, about 50 MC steps
before the transition, NA increase gradually from about
10 to 50. After the sharp increasing, NA still increase
gradually to the final stable state. Moreover, before the
sharp increasing happened, one can observe many black
blocks (the upper part of the left panel in figure 5). It
means the model has the similar feature of PDG in reg-
ular network that the C node tends to get together for
blocks to resist the D. These blocks start at a few Cs,
maybe three or more, and then close to each other in the
network coincidentally. Then a block is established and
it will grow to change their neighbors’ strategies. After
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Because the network structure in our model is one dimension lattice, we can use a color line to present
the snapshot of the status of the network. The black and white dots present C and D in BN. The green and red dots present C
and D in AN. In order to know how the AN, BN, and strategy evolve in network, we arrange these snapshots with time from
top to the botton at 1600 < t < 2100 in the left panel for the green line in Fig. 2. The right panel presents the time evolution
of the number of AN at the same time.
some MC steps, the block will shrink and then disappears
in the last. After the sharp increasing of NA, there are
too few red dots (D in AN). The green strip (C in AN)
indicates that the ANs or BNs are very stable in the net-
work. The probability of AN change to BN is very small
and vice versa.
C. Discussion
Based on the results in the above context, the effect
of α is different from various b and α. After the sharp
increasing, the nodes in network can be divided into AN
and BN. Almost all AN are C and the density of C in BN
is close to the case of α = 0. So we can use the mean field
theory and some basic feature of stable state to explain
why the sharp increasing happened.
After the sharp increasing in Fig. 3, the system reaches
the stable state gradually. Then we have dNA/dt = 0 or
NA→B = NB→A, where NA→B is the average number
of nodes changed from AN to BN in one MC step and
NB→A is that changed from BN to AN.
Considering that there are too few Ds in AN, we as-
sume that NA→B is only caused by C → D and ran-
dom rewire. Here, we neglect the preferential rewiring.
Because the contribution of preferential rewiring is only
about 2% of random rewiring. Then we get
NA→B = (1− pc)QA→BpcNA(
5 + N−NA
N
) (
4 + N−NA
N
)
NA +
(
5 + N−NA
N
) (
4 + N−NA
N
) . (4)
Here, pc means the change happened in the random
rewiring, and 5 + (N − NA)/N is the mean degree of
nodes in networks. We neglect self-connection and multi-
connection forbidden and we have N ≈ N − 1 here. Be-
cause AN has the same strategy with HN, AN only mim-
ics the strategy from other 4 + (N − NA)/N neighbors.
The big fraction is the probability of AN do not chose
HN to mimic the strategy. The last (1− pc) is the prob-
ability of mimicked target with strategy D. We assume
QA→B is the probability of success in the mimicking.
Then NB→A will be more complicate. We assume
that BN change to AN because they use the preferential
rewiring. The contribution of random rewiring is about
0.2% of preferential rewiring, so we neglect it and derive
the following formula,
6NB→A = [pBc(1− pc) + (1− pBc)pc]QB→A(1− pc)NB
(NA + 5)
α
(NA + 5)α +NA(2 + 4pc)α + pBcNB
(
1 + (5 + N−NA
N
)pc
)α
+NB(1− pBc)
(
b(5 + N−NA
N
)pc
)α , (5)
where 1−pc means the preferential rewiring, and pBc(1−
pc) is the probability of BN with strategy C to mimic its
D neighbor and that D try to mimic its C neighbor.
The fraction here is the probability of node rewire to HN
using the preferential rewiring. We assume QB→A is the
probability of success in the mimicking.
Now, one can get pBc from the simulation of α = 0.0
and pc = (pBcNB + NA)/N , and then we know how
NA evolves with time by using NB→A − NA→B. If
NB→A − NA→B = 0, NA will not change with time.
And NB→A −NA→B > 0 means NA will increase in the
next MC step. However, we do not know QA→B and
QB→A yet. According that the mean payoff of BN with
D is larger than mean payoff of AN in Tab. I, we con-
jecture M = QB→A/QA→B and M > 1. Indeed, we find
M = 2.0 is fit to our model. We will take b = 1.5 with
α = 1.9 and α = 1.3 as examples. For b = 1.5 and α = 0
we get pc = 0.314 from the simulation.
Fig. 6 plots dNA/dt as different NA. For α = 1.3
there are two stable points at NA = 3 and 860, and one
unstable point at NA = 23. For α = 1.9, there is only
one stable state at NA = 939. The unstable point will
decrease with the increasing of α and coincident with the
first stable point at α = 1.69. However, even α = 0, the
maximal degree in the network is about 12. So the first
stable point can be discarded. When the unstable point
crosses NA = 12 or there is only one stable point, the
system will reach to the second stable point.
IV. CONCLUSION
The coevolution of dynamics and network structure is
rapidly becoming an important field of the evolutionary
game. It contains more details about the social inter-
action in the real world. In this paper, we build a co-
evolution model of PDG and network structure. Each
node in network has four fixed local links and one ad-
justable LRL. When the node changes its strategy, it will
rewire its LRL to another node according to the node’s
payoff and density of cooperation. And we introduce a
parameter α to denote the effect of payoff.
Many early works [18, 19, 21? ] also proved that the
adaptive network can enhance the cooperation. All these
enhancements are caused by the emergency of cooperator
with large degree in the network. In [19], the cooperation
is very sensitive to the plasticity parameter and only the
adaptive network can enhance the cooperation.
In our model, the players rewire their LRLs for any
α, but the cooperation is enhanced only in the case of
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FIG. 6: (Color online)NB→A−NA→B with variousNA. Panel
(b) is an enlargement of (a).
α > 0 that this enhancement is obvious for α > 1.6 in a
certain region of b. However, our results show that the
enhancement of cooperation only happen in the case of
changing the network structure property. In our model,
for α = 0, the node will also rewire its LRL, but the net-
work property will not change and the cooperation level
will not be enhanced. The cooperation is enhanced only
when the node rewires its LRL according to the payoff.
Similar phenomena was also observed in our simulations
with snowdrift game (SG). We found that SG is more
sensitive to α than PDG and the obvious enhancement is
for a smaller α. So we conjecture that the coevolution of
network structure and game is an important mechanics
to maintain the cooperation in the real society.
Different from the results in [18, 19, 20, 21] which the
cooperation always dominates in the adaptive network
and the increasing of cooperation is limited. That is
7caused by two reasons: (1) In the probability of pc the
player use the random rewiring. (2) The existance of four
fixed links in network can be regarded as a noise to pre-
vent the preferential selection. In [20], authors discussed
the leaders and the global cascades. If every node could
change its strategy in a smaller probability, the global
cascades of coopertation is also observed in our model.
The analysis in this paper is based on the balance of
AN and BN. However, when the sharp increasing didn’t
happen, perhaps there exist more than one HNs and HN
is changing from one node to another frequently. Because
of the absense of the information about spacial structure
and Eq. 2, the presented analysis in this model is not very
precise any more. Actually, it is impossible to include all
the details for the analysis. We just hold on the main
factors of the model and it works well enough to explain
the main features of our model.
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